Why Business Owners Disclose Marginalized Identities
Questions, pushback, and wild ideas welcome.
Kyle Emory McCullers · Ross School of Business, University of Michigan

Brooklyn Blooms
Does not disclose any identity

Brooklyn Tea
Discloses race

The Lit Bar
Discloses race, gender, and ethnicity
Source: Google Street View
Black-owned businesses · 2020
"How The Black Lives Matter Movement Boosted Local Black-Owned Businesses"
GBH · 2021"Black businesses still face systemic racism — even from well-meaning customers"
Washington Post · 2020Asian-owned businesses · COVID-19
"The Best AAPI-Owned Businesses to Shop Right Now"
NBC News Select"Reports of Anti-Asian hate crimes rose nearly 150% in major U.S. cities"
CBS News · 2021Palestinian-owned businesses · 2023
"A Palestinian-owned business guide to show solidarity"
USA Today · 2023"Jewish groups call for boycott of pro-Palestinian businesses"
Forward · 2023Latino-owned businesses · 2024–2025
"Support Lake Street Latino businesses as immigration fears keep customers away"
Star Tribune · 2025"Hispanic businesses in Montgomery feeling 'hunted' after triple-slaying"
NBC News · 2024The solidarity signal is made necessary by discrimination exposure. Visibility attracts aligned customers and invites retaliation simultaneously.
Some find gains (Kim & Liu, 2025) · Others find clear penalties (Nunley et al., 2011; Doleac & Stein, 2013; Younkin & Kuppuswamy, 2018) · Some support is symbolic (Sharma, Frake & Watson, 2025)
Social identities have long been grounds for discrimination, marginalization, and even violence, and were historically concealed from potential consumers — Du Bois (1935) · Bonilla-Silva (1997) · Acker (2006) · Phillips & Kim (2009)
"Why would a business owner voluntarily disclose a marginalized identity?"
Identity Theory
Concealment is the default — disclosure has a cost to be managed
Goffman (1963)
Group membership is claimed when it enables favorable comparisons
Tajfel & Turner (1979)
A Black-sounding name costs 50% of callbacks
Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004)
Explains how stigmatized identities are managed — not when disclosure becomes a competitive signal.
Competitive Strategy
Advantage comes from resources that are valuable, rare, and hard to imitate
Porter (1980) · Barney (1991) · Wernerfelt (1984)
Disclosure is a signal — its value depends on what the receiver believes about the sender
Spence (1973)
Strategic positioning has asymmetric, context-dependent returns — the same choice attracts some stakeholders and exposes the firm to others
Alcácer & Chung (2007)
Explains when identity produces advantage — takes the disclosure decision itself as given.
Identity theory explains how stigmatized identities are managed. Strategy explains when resources produce advantage. This paper asks the question that precedes both: when does an owner treat their own identity as a resource at all?
Performance outcomes
Aneja, Luca & Reshef (2025)
Platform disclosure boosts foot traffic and orders — returns concentrated in Democratic, lower-bias areas.
Performance outcomes
Sharma, Frake & Watson (2025)
BLM drove symbolic support for Black-owned businesses but no meaningful increase in revenue.
Responds to calls to center marginalized entrepreneurs in management research — Phillips et al. (ROB, 2024); Phillips & Ranganathan (ASQ, 2025).
Stage 1 — All three required
Marginalized identity
Owner holds a stigmatized or discriminated identity
Positioning discretion
Owner-operator with direct agency over how the business presents
Legitimacy beliefs
Views identity as a potentially legitimate competitive dimension
Structural — any absent condition forecloses disclosure before Stage 2 is reached.
Stage 2 — Either suffices
Bounded solidarity
Co-ethnic in-group reciprocity · county Black pop. share
Generalized solidarity
Values-aligned ally support · state Dem. vote margin
Identity commitment
Moral obligation independent of market calculation
Perceived — owners differ even when structural conditions are identical.
J1 — Bounded Solidarity
Co-ethnic in-group reciprocity. Owners perceive that neighbors who share the same identity will extend preferential patronage.
Portes & Sensenbrenner, AJS (1993)
Ideal statement
I know my neighborhood will show up.
Proxy: county Black population share
J2 — Generalized Solidarity
Values-aligned out-group allies. Owners perceive the broader community embraces equity norms, reducing disclosure risk and adding cross-group demand.
Greenberg & Mollick (2017)
Ideal statement
The community broadly values what I'm doing.
Proxy: Democratic vote margin
Disclosure increases with Black population share. (J₁)
Disclosure increases with Democratic vote margin. (J₂)
The J₁ effect attenuates in Democratic counties — J₂ substitutes for J₁ when ally demand is already active. (Partial substitution — the paper's decisive test)
Identity tag system — opt-in, permanent until removed, publicly visible
Google's identity tag system allows business owners to voluntarily self-report attributes. Tags appear as colored pill labels on the listing. Approximately 14,000 (0.28% of all listings; ~8.7% of 161,000 Census-identified Black-owned employer businesses) use the Black-owned attribute.
Unit of analysis: business listings geocoded to county. Outcome: Black-owned tag (0/1). Census RDC application in progress for county-level Black-owned business counts — the correct at-risk denominator.
Scope: Voluntary platform disclosure — theoretically distinct from MWBE certification or government-contracting-driven disclosure, both of which carry strong and interpretable selection pressures not present here.
US Census — ACS 5-Year Estimates
County-level Black population share and poverty rate. Anchors the bounded solidarity proxy and serves as a primary control.
MIT Election Lab — Presidential Returns
County-level Democratic vote margin, 2020 presidential election. Operationalizes generalized solidarity.
H3 predicts that J₂ is an alternative activation pathway — in Democratic counties, co-ethnic density matters less because generalized solidarity is already active.
Quadrant finding
Q1 is 4.5× Q3. J₁ alone barely moves the needle — political context is the multiplier.
Main regression — logit, SEs clustered by county
| DV: Black-owned tag | H1 Bounded |
H2 Generalized |
H3 Interaction |
H4 Discriminant |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black pop. share (%) | 0.090*** | — | 0.140*** | — |
| (0.010) | (0.023) | |||
| Dem. vote margin | — | 0.015*** | — | — |
| (0.002) | ||||
| Dem. majority (binary) | — | — | 0.481*** | — |
| (0.076) | ||||
| Black pop. × Dem. majority | — | — | −0.090** | — |
| (0.031) | ||||
| Veteran-led × Dem. majority | — | — | — | 0.002 |
| (0.022) | ||||
| State + industry FE, controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| N (businesses) | 152,794 | |||
*** p<.001 ** p<.01. H4 interaction p=.93 — discriminant validity confirmed.
The negative H3 coefficient is the key result: in Democratic counties, J₂ is already active — so the marginal contribution of co-ethnic density shrinks. Bounded and generalized solidarity are partial substitutes, not complements.
Anomaly
Only 0.29% of Google Places businesses carry a Black-owned tag.
If this is a strategic decision, who is making it — and who could? There is no ground-truth denominator in the Google Places universe.
Committee challenge: the denominator problem has no obvious solution in the main data.
New Data
SBA PPP FOIA data: 11.7 million loan recipients, self-reported race at application.
776,414 unique Black-owned businesses provide a government-verified at-risk population. 10,009 match to Google Places listings.
True denominator: verified Black business owners who could have disclosed.
Revised Understanding
True rate: 7.5%. Political climate effect strengthens. Co-ethnic density disappears.
The pattern divergence demands explanation: county-level H1 reflects who is in the denominator, not a causal mechanism. The theory holds at the right level of analysis.
Abduction: anomaly → new data → stronger, more precise theory.
Abductive inference: the unexpected pattern (H1 vanishes; H2 strengthens) reveals that the county-level analysis captures selection into the denominator, not the causal mechanism of interest — pointing toward a multi-level theoretical account (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012).
True at-risk population
Black-owned PPP borrowers
824KUnique Black-owned businesses
776KWith complete covariates
7,195vs. 0.29% using all Google Places businesses as denominator
Disclosure rate by political climate quintile · verified Black-owned borrowers
State political climate (Most Republican → Most Democratic)
✓ Directional increase · H2 holds in verified sample
When the denominator is verified Black-owned businesses, political climate is the primary structural driver of disclosure. The flat H1 pattern is a methodological insight: co-ethnic density predicts who is in the denominator — not who, among them, chooses to disclose.
Democratic counties
Republican counties
4.5 pp gap
p < .05
Of 13,138 disclosers in 2021, 78.8% overall still disclosing in 2026. The same solidarity structures that activate disclosure sustain it.
What predicts retention?
Black population share (β=0.925, p<.001) and Democratic vote margin (β=0.608, p<.001) — the same solidarity structures that activate initial disclosure also sustain it. Extends H1 and H2 to persistence.
Where do owners drop off? Not the Deep South — structural thinness.
Where co-ethnic and ally demand is too thin to sustain the signal, disclosure quietly lapses.
Drop-off correlates with both lower Black population share and lower Democratic margin (r ≈ −0.21, p<.0001 each) — consistent with the bounded and generalized solidarity mechanisms operating jointly on persistence, not just entry.
"I didn't realize how radical it was to say, I'm creating a black space for black people by black people... my being here, even being a successful entrepreneur, was an act of resistance."
Entrepreneurship educator · Detroit Metro · K: identity as resistance"I'm going to drive that angle. But then there's also the dangerous side — I'm Jewish, but I'm not going to drive on that... that can be dangerous for business."
Boutique owner · Ann Arbor · Same owner — opposite disclosure across two identities"I want to win the blind taste test every time. I don't want people to be like, 'Yeah, I liked hers because she was a white girl from Michigan and I identify with that.' I don't care about that. I think that is a crutch to me."
Food & beverage owner · Ann Arbor · Product Purist — identity as competitive dimension, rejected"When we opened we were only 26... Koreans would come in from the suburbs. It was like a cult of party Koreans. And it did play a big role."
Restaurant owner · Ann Arbor · J₁: bounded solidarity through co-ethnic visibilityIdentity as a Conditional Strategic Resource
Theorizes the structural prerequisites for voluntary identity disclosure — separating Stage 1 (enabling conditions) from Stage 2 (activation triggers). Explains who enters the calculation, not just when it pays.
Solidarity as a Geographically Structured Mechanism
Bounded and generalized solidarity are distinct mechanisms — partial substitutes, not complements — that predict disclosure rates with 3–4× variation across U.S. counties.
Where this goes next
Census RDC
County-level Black-owned business counts — the correct at-risk denominator. Application submitted April 2026; awaiting review.
Companion Qualitative Study
In-depth interviews examining individual strategic orientations. Pilot interviews underway — Ann Arbor and Detroit Metro.
Questions, pushback, and suggestions on theory, data, or framing are all welcome.
Kyle McCullers · University of Michigan Ross
kylemcc@umich.eduI'd love to hear from you — on the theory, the data, or anything else.