Department Lunchbox · March 12, 2026

Strategic Identity
Disclosure

Where and Why Business Owners Disclose Marginalized Identities

Questions, pushback, and wild ideas welcome.

Kyle McCullers — PhD Candidate, Strategy Area, Ross School of Business · M.A. Candidate, Sociology

University of Michigan
Committee: Christopher Rider · Justin Frake · Elizabeth Armstrong · Gerald Davis · Alford Young

In the tradition of…

Standing on two calls to action

"Management scholars have systematically understudied… entrepreneurs from marginalized groups."

Phillips & Ranganathan (2025) · Administrative Science Quarterly
"Addressing Marginalized Populations in Management Research"

"The entrepreneurship literature speaks mainly to white, college-educated founders. This paper is a call to expand that conversation."

Hwang & Phillips (2024) · Review of Organizational Behavior
"We Are Experts on Elite Entrepreneurs"

Why private businesses matter most

99% of US businesses are privately held
77% of US private-sector workers are employed by non-publicly traded companies

S-Corp Association (2021) · Apollo Global (2022)

The firms we study — private, owner-operated — employ the majority of American workers.

Today's agenda

Roadmap

01  Introduction The Puzzle & Stakes Slides 4–8 02  Theory Framework & Hypotheses Slides 9–19 03  Data + Results Evidence Slides 20–28 04  Conclusion Contributions & Next Steps Slides 29–31
Introduction

Three businesses. Same platform. Different choices.

Brooklyn Blooms Google Maps listing
No identity tags
Owner A

Brooklyn Blooms

Does not disclose any identity

Brooklyn Tea Google Maps listing
Black-owned
Owner B

Brooklyn Tea

Discloses race

The Lit Bar Google Maps listing
Black-owned LGBTQ+ Friendly Women-owned Latino-owned
Owner C

The Lit Bar

Discloses race, gender, and ethnicity

Why it matters

The stakes are real — and non-disclosure is the dominant strategy

$50B+ Leading companies have committed more than $50B to partner with minority- and women-owned businesses
(McKinsey, 2022)
0.29% Of 4.99M U.S. Google Maps listings
display the Black-owned tag
Sept. 2021
Research Question

"When and where do business owners choose to disclose marginalized identities on digital platforms?"

The puzzle, formalized

What predicts whether an owner discloses?

Aneja, Luca & Reshef (2025)

Labeling restaurants as minority-owned on a platform boosted traffic, calls, orders, and visits — meaning there is latent consumer demand to support Black-owned businesses, concentrated in more Democratic, less racially biased areas.

Sharma, Frake & Watson (2025)

BLM drove a surge in symbolic support (reviews, ratings) for Black-owned businesses but produced no meaningful increase in substantive support (revenue, foot traffic) — outrage translated into likes, not dollars.

The puzzle, formalized

What predicts whether an owner discloses?

?

The variation to explain: 0.29% disclosure rate*

→ Neither source alone tells us why owners decide. We need a theory of the decision.

Aneja, Luca & Reshef (2025)

Labeling restaurants as minority-owned on a platform boosted traffic, calls, orders, and visits — latent demand exists, but it's geographically concentrated.

Sharma, Frake & Watson (2025)

BLM drove symbolic support (reviews, ratings) but no meaningful increase in substantive support (revenue, foot traffic) — outrage translated into likes, not dollars.

* Disclosure is calculated through the Google Maps platform only. Other platforms (e.g., Yelp) can be incorporated into this calculation once the data are secured.

A parallel from strategy

Identity as a credible signal: The eponymy case

"Firms named after their founder outperform anonymous firms on profitability and survival — even controlling for firm size, age, and industry."

Belenzon, Chatterji & Daley · American Economic Review (2017)

Why? The owner's name is a credible commitment signal. It stakes personal reputation on firm quality.

Entrepreneurs who name their firms after themselves perform better — because eponymy acts as a credible signal of quality by tying the owner's personal reputation directly to the firm's success or failure.

Eponymy: the practice of naming a business after its founder or owner — an identity signal embedded in the firm's name itself.

Theory

Chapter 3 sits at four intersecting conversations

Identity Theory

Goffman (Stigma, 1963) · Tajfel & Turner (Differentiation between Social Groups, 1979) · King, Felin & Whetten (Academy of Management Review, 2010)

Competitive Positioning

Porter (Competitive Strategy, 1980) · Barney (Journal of Management, 1991) · Podolny (Administrative Science Quarterly, 1993)

Social Capital

Portes & Sensenbrenner (American Journal of Sociology, 1993)

Racialized Identity at Work

Arnett (2023) · Phillips et al. (2009) · Ray (2019)

Theory · Identity Theory

What the identity literature tells us

Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963)

Individuals actively manage how they present potentially discrediting information — stigmatized identities are suppressed, disclosed selectively, or converted into sources of pride.

Tajfel & Turner, Differentiation Between Social Groups (1979)

Group membership drives self-concept; individuals seek positive distinctiveness by emphasizing group identities when they expect favorable comparisons.

King, Felin & Whetten, Academy of Management Review (2010)

Organizational identity claims function as coordination devices — what a firm says it stands for shapes how members behave and how stakeholders respond.

My question: under what conditions is racial identity claimed as an asset rather than managed as a stigma?

Theory · Competitive Positioning

What the strategy literature tells us

Porter, Competitive Strategy (1980)

Sustainable advantage comes from a distinctive strategic position — differentiation, cost leadership, or focus — that competitors cannot easily replicate.

Barney, Journal of Management (1991)

Sustained competitive advantage derives from resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN).

Podolny, Administrative Science Quarterly (1993)

Under market uncertainty, buyers use observable signals — status cues — to infer product quality. High-status sellers command premiums without necessarily having better products.

This paper is in conversation with these frameworks: they motivate why disclosure decisions carry economic stakes. But they don't explain when or why an owner decides to disclose — that's the question this paper answers.

Theory · Social Capital

What the social capital literature tells us

Portes & Sensenbrenner, American Journal of Sociology (1993)

Bounded solidarity — the emergence of shared sentiments among in-group members — leads to unified economic action without formal enforcement. Co-ethnic markets form around trust and reciprocity.

Author's theoretical contribution

Generalized solidarity — support from out-group members inspired by events affecting the in-group — is a distinct mechanism that can also drive disclosure. (Under investigation in 45+ interviews; forthcoming paper.)

Key question: which form of solidarity — bounded or generalized — predicts disclosure, and where?

Theory · Racialized Identity at Work

What the racialized identity literature tells us

Arnett (2023)

Expressing a rich, detailed cultural identity — rather than suppressing it — can paradoxically increase inclusion by making identity legible and connective to others.

Phillips, Rothbard & Dumas (2009)

Status distance shapes whether identity disclosure promotes or undermines relationship quality — the audience's social position determines how disclosure lands.

Ray (2019)

Organizations are not racially neutral — they are racialized structures that allocate resources and credibility along racial lines, embedding inequality into organizational foundations.

Our addition: these dynamics play out on digital platforms at scale — 4.99M listings, observable disclosure choices.

Theory

Classic rational choice doesn't tell us the entire story

Standard prediction: Disclose when E[returns] > E[costs].

But Aneja et al. show heterogeneous returns — two owners in the same city, same market, can face identical expected returns and still make opposite choices.

The missing piece:

Disclosure is a two-stage decision. Enabling conditions make it possible; activation triggers make it happen. Classic signaling theory only models the second stage.

Theory — Framework · Part 1 of 3

Enabling conditions — all three required

A ∧ B ∧ C

All three must be present. Any absent condition forecloses disclosure.

A

Owner possesses a racialized identity that is visible and verifiable on the platform

B

Owner perceives the local market as amenable to identity-based positioning (positive expected returns in the geographic market context)

C

Owner perceives the disclosure environment as safe (low retaliation risk, institutional legitimacy)

Theory — Framework · Part 2 of 3

Activation triggers — either suffices

J ∨ K

J ∨ K means at least one activation mechanism must be perceived as present.

J — Bounded Solidarity

Owner perceives tight in-group community norms and expects reciprocal support from co-ethnic buyers

Portes & Sensenbrenner (American Journal of Sociology, 1993)

K — Generalized Solidarity

Owner perceives broad, cross-group demand for Black-owned business support (allyship economy)

(Author's theoretical contribution)

Theory — Framework · Part 3 of 3

The complete decision framework

(A ∧ B ∧ C) ∧ (J ∨ K)

Enabling Conditions

A ∧ B ∧ C

+

Activation Trigger

J ∨ K

→

Disclosure Decision

Quick reference — all conditions

Enabling (A ∧ B ∧ C — all required):

A

Possesses a verifiable, platform-visible marginalized identity

B

Perceives the local market as amenable to identity-based positioning

C

Perceives the disclosure environment as safe (low retaliation risk)

Activation (J ∨ K — either suffices):

J

Perceived bounded solidarity — expects reciprocal in-group support

K

Perceived generalized solidarity — expects broad cross-group demand

Theory

J: Perceived community support mediates the disclosure decision

J — Bounded Solidarity

Tight in-group community norms

Geographic concentration of co-ethnic customers

"I know my neighborhood will show up"

"Bounded solidarity: the emergence of shared sentiments among group members that lead to unified economic action."
— Portes & Sensenbrenner, American Journal of Sociology (1993)

K — Generalized Solidarity

Broad cross-group demand for equity consumption

Platform-mediated allyship signals

"The world is watching — and buying"

(Author's theoretical contribution — under investigation in 45+ interview study)

The key empirical question: which type predicts disclosure — and where?

Theory — Testable Predictions

Three hypotheses

H1

Black business owners in geographies with higher Black population shares are more likely to enable the Black-owned identity tag on Google Maps.

H2

Black business owners in geographies with higher Democratic vote margins (a proxy for local political alignment) are more likely to disclose.

H3

The positive effect of Democratic vote margin on disclosure is stronger in geographies with higher Black population concentration. (Interaction hypothesis.)

H3 is the interaction of J (bounded solidarity) and B (market perception) — operationalized as population × political alignment.

Data + Results

Google Maps as an empirical field site

4.99M U.S. business listings
3,144 Counties covered
Sept. 2021 Cross-section date

Identity tag system — opt-in, permanent until removed, publicly visible

Black-owned Women-owned LGBTQ+-owned Latino-owned Asian-owned Veteran-owned Indigenous-owned

Google's identity tag system allows business owners to voluntarily self-report attributes. Tags appear as colored pill labels on the listing.

Unit of analysis: business listings geocoded to county. Outcome: Black-owned tag (0/1).

Data — Measurement Challenge

The denominator problem: Who is at risk of disclosing?

All Google Maps listings 4.99M
Black-owned businesses in the U.S. (US Census) ~195K
Displaying the Black-owned tag ~14,500
Data — Descriptive Evidence

The bookstore example: Describing the at-risk set

Using aalbc.com (African American Literature Book Club) verified universe of Black-owned independent bookstores as a clean at-risk sample.

57.7% No identity tag of any kind
on Google Maps
42.3% At least one identity tag enabled
(majority have multiple)

Even in a population we know is Black-owned, fewer than half have enabled any tag. The decision to disclose requires explanation.

Source: aalbc.com verified list, cross-referenced with Google Maps API, Sept. 2021

Data — Reading the Evidence

What we're measuring and why

Low Dem. Margin
High Dem. Margin
High Black
Population
High pop., low support Large in-group market, limited political alignment — bounded solidarity may operate, but environmental safety (C) is uncertain.
High pop., high support Theory predicts highest disclosure: large co-ethnic market AND politically supportive environment. Both J and B conditions met.
Low Black
Population
Low pop., low support Theory predicts lowest disclosure: small in-group market and unsupportive environment. Neither J nor B conditions met.
Low pop., high support Generalized solidarity (K) may compensate for small in-group — allyship market exists even where co-ethnic market is thin.
Data + Results

Quadrant finding: disclosure concentrates where theory predicts

Low Black Pop
High Black Pop
High Dem Margin
0.12% Q2 — partial condition
0.36% Q1 — both conditions met
Low Dem Margin
0.08% Q3 — lowest rate
0.12% Q4 — partial condition

Q1 is 3× the rate of Q3. The intersection of community size and political support matters.

Data + Results

Main regression: OLS county-level disclosure rate

Variable β SE p
Black population share (county) 0.0090 0.0012 <.001
Democratic vote margin (2020) 0.0041 0.0008 <.001
Pop × Dem margin (interaction) 0.0023 0.0006 <.001
Constant 0.0012 0.0003 <.001
N = 3,144 counties  ·  R² = 0.041

• Black population share: For every 10 percentage-point increase in a county's Black population share, the local disclosure rate rises by ~0.09 pp — roughly a 30% increase over the baseline of 0.29%.

• Democratic vote margin: For every 10-point swing toward Democrats, the disclosure rate rises by ~0.04 pp — political climate matters independently of community size.

• Interaction: The political-climate effect is roughly 25% larger in high-Black-population counties than low-population ones — solidarity and political environment amplify each other, not just add.

Limitation to flag: Democratic vote margin is also a proxy for urban density, education, and the composition of the potential allyship market — not political alignment alone. A cleaner instrument for the generalized solidarity mechanism (K) is a priority for the next version of this analysis.

↗ Open MSA Maps
Data + Results

Robustness: coefficient stable across specifications

Census tract level β = 0.0087

N = 84,000+ tracts · SE = 0.0013
Consistent with county-level finding

Uses smaller geographic units (~4,000 residents) where the local market context is more homogeneous — if the effect holds here, it isn't a county-level aggregation artifact.

ZCTA level β = 0.0091

N = 32,000+ zip codes · SE = 0.0011
Narrower SE due to more within-county variation

ZIP codes cross county lines; this rules out that county boundaries are driving the result.

NY State replication β = 0.0088

N = 14,972 businesses · SE = 0.0019
Fully geocoded · Consistent

New York provides a fully geocoded, independently verified sample — confirms the finding is not specific to the national dataset construction.

Spatial lag model Moran's I = 0.04

Low spatial autocorrelation
Coefficient robust to spatial controls

Controls for the possibility that neighboring counties influence each other's disclosure rates — the effect is not a geographic spillover.

Coefficient range across specifications: 0.0087–0.0091. Main finding is stable.

Data

Panel retention: 83.7% of listings persist

83.7% Panel retention rate
Sept. 2021 → follow-up period

Why this matters for inference:

1.

Rules out survivorship bias — disclosure patterns are not artifacts of which businesses closed

2.

Enables change-over-time analysis (tagging on/off) in follow-up work

3.

High retention validates the cross-section as stable rather than a snapshot of churn

Non-retaining listings are disproportionately small/new businesses — no systematic disclosure-rate difference from retainers.

Conclusion

Where Chapter 3 fits into my dissertation

Ch. 1 Historical sociology of Black business visibility · Archival In progress
Ch. 2 Platform infrastructure & minority entrepreneur access In progress
Ch. 3 Strategic Identity Disclosure · Quantitative Analysis complete ← Current
Ch. 4 Why owners decide · 45+ interviews In progress
Ch. 5 Ethnography of platform capitalism for minority entrepreneurs In progress

What's Next

Ch. 4 Interviews

15 completed, 30+ remaining; focus on the mechanism (J vs. K)

Ch. 5 Ethnography

Field entry spring 2026

Ch. 1 Archival

National Negro Business League records, 1900–1960

Conclusion

Two contributions

C1

A Conditional Theory of Disclosure Decisions

This paper offers a theory of when identity disclosure decisions occur — not whether disclosure produces advantage. Enabling conditions and activation triggers must both be satisfied before an owner will disclose, and those conditions are structured by the social geography of local markets. The geographic contingency is a finding about where those conditions are met, not a claim about competitive outcomes.

C2

Solidarity as a Disclosure Mechanism

Bounded and generalized solidarity are distinct mechanisms that activate disclosure under different structural conditions — and they are complements, not substitutes. Where both are present, disclosure rates are roughly 4× what they are where neither applies. This extends the social capital literature to a new domain: voluntary, public identity claims on digital platforms.

Department Lunchbox · March 12, 2026

Thank You

Questions, pushback, and suggestions on theory, data, or framing are all welcome.

Kyle McCullers  ·  kmcculle@umich.edu